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CML PROCEDURE: CASES AND COMMENTS ON THE PROCESS OF
JUDICATION.

Pp.

XXX,

Law schools have come full circle. Christopher Langdell took us
from rule and pleading and court to case and theory and university.
But we are tired of that journey. And so we now see another path
charted-this time away from university, cases, and theory and back
to rule, pleading, and court. Doctrine is in a bad way. The death
knell has been sounded for the Langdellian casebook. Those wonderful chapters of over-edited cases, each inserted to prove the precise legal point which its neighbor was inserted to deny, are becoming antiques. Specialists in the ways of legal orchestration and of
doctrinal point-counterpoint are no longer the practitioners of an
admired art. Doctrine as a framework for a casebook, therefore, has
been fairly well, and perhaps justly, repudiated.
If a casebook editor is thoughtful, however, he is put to a hard
choice. On the one hand, he is quite willing to break with the doctrinal past. On the other hand, he still wants to write a book with an
intellectual framework-a book which will be solid and serviceable.
Professor Carrington's resolution of this problem makes a good deal
of sense.
At the end of chapter 2, in an interesting section on the effective
use of his book, Professor Carrington says that "[i]t is now apparent
that the cases contained in this book were not selected for the purpose of communicating doctrine through the language of inductive
reasoning" (p. 171). Carrington's chosen framework for his book is
not doctrine but process, and he views the process of civil litigation
through a lens which is informed and unopinionated.
This book of 951 pages of text is divided into eleven chapters.
The first section of the book is designed to require the student to
"face almost the whole course at once in a first view" (p. 171). That
first view comprises 170 pages and absorbs two chapters. Thus, chapter I grapples with problems of enforcing a judgment and attempts
as well to expose something of the range in the variety of relief that
courts can fashion. Chapter 2 discusses first the meaning of the appellate process and then exceptions to the final-decision rule. There
is utility in attempting to teach the arcana of interlocutory-order
problems after the student has examined the appellate process. Once
the student has reflected on what an appeal is, he is in a better position to assess the wisdom of the various exceptions to the general
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theme of federal practice that interlocutory orders are not appealable.
Chapter 3, "Persons in Power: The Decision Makers," calls attention to the men who staff the judicial process. The first section
of the chapter inquires into qualifications for judicial office. The
inclusion of materials on judicial qualifications is a timely but rare
undertaking in procedure casebooks. The bewildered response to
l'affaire Haynesworth is proof enough of that. Chapter 3 also deals
with the removal of judges and with disqualification in particular
cases-again matters to which we have had, and to which we are
likely to have, continuing exposure. The chapter concludes with an
introduction to the role of the jury in the judicial process.
In chapter 4, the focus shifts to the trial situation. That chapter
discusses the different fact-finding roles of judge and jury. Chapter
5 is concerned with the role that the adversary process plays in
making a factual record. Chapter 6 opens with a study of the discovery process and follows with a discussion on pleadings. Thus, the
problem of pleading, with which some procedure teachers might
begin a book in procedure, comes after the material on discovery.
Pleading, in other words, is not directly encountered by the student
until nearly the middle of the book. Pedagogically, putting discovery before pleading is quite reasonable. Use of the opposite sequence, the more common tack, often does some damage to the
hopes of the new world of federal discovery, because students become prematurely fond of the complaint to the disadvantage of
subsequent appreciation of the discovery devices. It is at this juncture in the book that the reader begins to comprehend the editor's
intention, candidly stated in the introduction, that "proceeding
backward" (p. 4) to the study of the judicial process is a conscious
design of the book. He argues that some of the difficulties encountered prior to trial are best understood after there has been exposure
to the problems of trial. That argument, presumably, explains why
the materials on trial precede the materials on discovery and pleading.
The balance of the book covers not only the frequently encountered materials on federal jurisdiction, res judicata, and multi-party
litigation, but also less traditional subjects, such as professional responsibility and contingent-fee problems, both of which are often
scorned or underplayed in procedure courses.
There is little of the how-to-do-it approach in this book: no essays on drafting, no appendices full of stale pleadings. Similarly
there is very little concession to the fashions of the moment. Perhaps there is in this regard too little concession. It is interesting
that, in the preface to the recent edition of their successful and influential book, Professors Field and Kaplan make the remark that,
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although they decided in their new edition to adhere "to the coverage, the method, and the objectives that appealed to us when we
began our collaboration,"1 nevertheless-and to me these are very
interesting reflections-their temptation to depart from the first
edition was strong:
Certainly one can imagine a worthy and viable course in which
a study of the besetting facts of delay and expense of litigation
would displace a good deal of preoccupation with procedural doctrine. There are other alternative patterns for the course that would
make contemporary sense. But for the present we have stuck to our
last.2

Indeed, delay and expense of litigation could well make the theme
of a procedure book.
The emphasis in Carrington's volume, however, is institutional;
the basic theme is process, and in terms of evoking that theme the
book succeeds. Carrington's implicit suggestion is that the judicial
process, the rules of procedure, and the problems of federal jurisdiction (on which this book has particularly rich materials) are essentially serviceable to the social needs which litigation is designed
to satisfy. But he is realistic enough to point out that use of the
process is quite often found to be on a level less than optimal. Chapter 7, "Protection Against Misuse of the Process," is in this regard
an especially critical and useful chapter.
In his introduction Professor Carrington writes that his book has
a hero: "The hero is the romantic ideal that power can be made
to serve principles rather than the men who wield it" (p. 1). He says
also that only "the simple minded will believe that power always
and unerringly responds to law" (p. I). I think it clear that these
remarks display a liberal and a humanist faith in the courts and
their processes-a faith that is quite different from the activist or
instrumentalist faith in courts. Ralph Nader has recently pointed
out, in that remarkable and non-self-serving honesty which is the
despair of his critics, that recent efforts by consumers in the courts
have, on the whole, not changed the social landscape as much as the
rhetoric expended on the subject might indicate. Carrington's lowkeyed approach to the teaching of procedure is not founded on expectations that the judicial process will win very many social revolutions. What he gives us is a competent introduction to the uncertainties of procedure. The book is an effort to acquaint the student
with the way courts, particularly the federal courts, manage not only
themselves, but also the lawyers and problems that come before
1. R. FIELD &: B. KAPLAN, MATERIALS

(temp. 2d ed. 1968).

2. Id.

FOR

A BASIC

COURSE

IN ClvIL

PROCEDURE

xii

April 1970]

Recent Books

1065

them. The student is encouraged to expect courts to behave fairly,
but not, I take it, momentously.
Looking at the book as a whole, then, it is clear that Professor
Carrington is addressing a very particular kind of student. These
materials were used by the author and others in unpublished form.
Carrington comments on that experience in the book:
Experience reveals that many students are frustrated by the
open-ended and speculative character of this presentation. It is to
be expected that only individuals with the greatest sense of emotional security can draw solace from the uncertainty that characterizes the judicial process. At some point, however, the educational
establishment must admit that it has run out of right answers about
which it can be reassuring. [P. 172.]

This frankness and honesty of approach characterize a new and interesting volume in a rapidly growing bookshelf of procedure casebooks.
Jerome A. Barron,
Professor of Law,
National Law Center,
George Washington University

